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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.,
131 S. Ct. 2254 (2011)
Synopsis:

The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle of giving
deference to regulatory agencies when interpreting their own
regulation, including interpretations in legal briefs. In doing so, the
Court held that a telecommunications carrier must make its existing
entrance facilities available to competitors at cost-based rates if the
facilities are to be used for interconnection. The Court's reasoning is
premised on the interpretation that the Federal Communication
Commission ("FCC") had advanced regarding its own regulation,
which the Court found reasonable, and as such, the interpretation was
given deference.
Facts and Analysis:

Talk America addressed regulations passed under the Federal
Communications Act of 1996 ("the 1996 Act"), a statute that
required telecommunications companies to provide their competitors
access to local exchange networks, such as the equipment used to
receive, route, and deliver phone calls without making a profit.' The
intent behind the Act was to increase competition by giving new
companies access to existing networks, thereby allowing them to
establish viable networks within the marketplace. 2
By way of the 1996 Act, in 2005 the FCC passed the latest in a
series of regulations addressing a company's obligation to provide
"entrance facilities" at cost-based rates under what is known as the
"interconnection" requirement, ensuring that a customer of a
company could call that company's competitors, and vice-versa.3

' Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254,
2257-58 (2011).
2 Id. at 2258.
3

Id.
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Thereafter, AT&T ceased to provides certain services to local
providers at a cost-based rate. 4
A number of local service providers complained to the
Michigan Public Service Commission that AT&T was unlawfully
abrogating their right to cost-based interconnection under the 1996
Act.5 The commission agreed and ordered AT&T to continue
providing entrance facilities for interconnection at cost-based rates. 6
AT&T then challenged the ruling in a federal district court, which
ruled in AT&T's favor.' The Sixth Circuit affirmed, despite a FCC
amicus brief arguing that their regulations did not change AT&T's
obligations.
Holding:
While the details of underlying regulation are complex and
technical, the Supreme Court's reasoning is nothing if not clear. The
Court held that lower courts must defer to an agency's interpretation
of its own regulations, including interpretationspropounded in legal
briefs, unless the interpretation is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation," or there is any other "reason to suspect that the
interpretation does not reflect the agency's fair and considered
judgment on the matter in question."9
The ruling reaffirms what is known as "Auer deference" from
the Supreme Court's decision in Auer v. Robbins.'0 Based on Auer
and its progeny, the Court has repeatedly directed lower courts to
"defer to an agency's interpretation of its own regulation, advanced in
a legal brief, unless that interpretation is 'plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation.""' Justice Scalia alone expressed
criticism of the doctrine in his concurring opinion, stating "[i]t seems

4

1d

5

Id. at 2259.

6

Id.

I Talk America, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2259-60.
8

1d.

9 Id. at 2261.

'oSee Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
" Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 881 (2011) (quoting
Auer, 519 U.S. at 452).
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contrary to fundamental principles of separation of powers to permit
the person who promulgates a law to interpret it as well."12
Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara Cnty., 131 S. Ct. 1342 (2011)
Synopsis:

The Court held that hospitals and community health centers
have no right to sue drug manufacturers as third-party beneficiaries
when the manufacturers violate an obligation made to federal
agencies that requires drug companies to discount certain drugs.
Permitting such private action would frustrate the regulatory regime
that Congress created when it vested sole authority in a particular
federal agency to oversee compliance.
Facts and Analysis:

Section 340B of the Public Health Services Act imposes a
price ceiling on manufacturers when charging for medications sold to
specified healthcare facilities.' The 340B program is administered
by the Health Resources and Services Administration, a unit of the
Department of Health and Human Services.' 4 Drug manufacturers
opt into the ceiling program by signing the Pharmaceutical Pricing
Agreement, which permits them to participate in state Medicaid
programs.
Respondent Santa Clara County, operator of several health
care facilities operating under the 340B program, filed suit against
Astra and eight other pharmaceutical companies, alleging that they
were overcharging in violation of the pricing agreement made under
the 340B program. 16 Claiming to be the intended third-party
beneficiary, the complaint sought compensatory damages for breach

12

Talk America, 131 S. Ct. at 2266 (Scalia J., concurring).

1342

U.S.C. § 256(b).

I4 Id.
' Id.
16 Astra

USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara Cnty., 131 S. Ct. 1342, 1347 (2011).
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of contract.1 7 All parties conceded that Congress authorized no
private right of action under the 340B program.' 8
The district court judge dismissed the complaint, concluding
that the 340B program and pricing agreement conferred no
enforceable rights to health facilities under the auspices of the
program.19 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that that while the
respondents have no right to sue under the statute, they could
nevertheless bring their suit against drug manufacturers as third-party
beneficiaries of the pricing agreement.2 0
Holding:
The Supreme Court held that a private action to enforce the
price agreement made under the 340B program is incompatible with
the statutory regime ,because Congress vested authority to supervise
compliance with the program solely with the Department of Health
and Human Services. 2 1 Respondents' argument maintaining that the
price agreements are enforceable under a third-party beneficiary
theory was rejected, as it overlooked the fact that the agreements
simply restated a statutory obligation and documented the
manufacturers' agreement to comply. 2 2
Noting that the agreements had no negotiable terms, the Court
reasoned that the pricing agreements are analogous to the Medicaid
Rebate Agreements and are not traditional contracts. 23 A third-party
suit to enforce an agreement between the Department of Health and
Human Services and drug manufactures, the Court concluded, is
essentially a suit to enforce the statute itself, which all parties agreed
Congress did not intend to permit.2 4

17Id.
18

Id.

19 Id.
20 Id.

Id. at 1349-50
22 Astra USA, Inc. 131 S. Ct. at 1348.
23 Id.
24 Id.
21
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Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.,
131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011)
Synopsis:

The Court interpreted a provision of The Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA"), in particular its prohibition of retaliation against
workers for alleged violations of the Act, as encompassing both oral
and written complaints made by those workers. While the meaning
of text in isolation may suggest ambiguity with respect to the issue,
the Court reasoned that given the purpose of the FLSA and the
deference given to the interpretations provided by the pertinent
regulatory agencies, only an interpretation that includes oral
complaints is permissible.
Facts and Analysis:

Kevin Kasten brought a lawsuit against his former employer
claiming a violation of the FLSA, because the employer located its
time clocks in an area that prevented workers from receiving credit
for the time they spent putting on and taking off their work clothes. 2 5
A federal district court judge ruled in Kasten's favor. 2 6
Subsequently, Kasten sued his former employer for unlawful
retaliation under the FLSA, claiming the employer fired him after he
orally complained about the location of the time clock. 27 The
employer disagreed, arguing Kasten was terminated because he
repeatedly failed to check in, even after being warned. The Court,
for present purposes only, accepted Kasten's facts as true.
The district court granted summary judgment to the employer
against Kasten because it found that the FLSA does not provide
protection for oral complaints. 2 8 The Seventh Circuit agreed that the
FLSA's antiretaliation provision does not protect oral complaints. 29

Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325,
1329 (2011).
26
1d. at 1329-30.
25

27

Id. at 1330.

28 Id.
29 Id.
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The Court granted certiorari in light of a split among the circuits on
the issue.3 0
Holding:
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Seventh Circuit,
vacating and remanding the case, because the Court found that the
scope of the statutory phrase "filed any complaint" includes oral, as
well as written, complaints. 3 1 In isolation, the Court reasoned that
the text could be understood as to not provide a conclusive answer as
to whether the term encompasses both oral and written complaints. 32
However, the Court reasoned further that "interpretation of this
phrase 'depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering
the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents
or authorities that inform the analysis."' 33 As such, the Court held
that only an interpretation that includes oral complains is
permissible. 34
The decision took into account that, in addition to dictionary
definitions, state statutes and federal regulations contemplate oral
filings.35 In addition, it was found that contemporaneous judicial
usage showed that oral filings were a known phenomenon at the time
of the FLSA's passage. 36 Moreover, where "file" may imply a more
restrictive reading, the addition of "any complaint" suggests a
broader interpretation that would include an oral complaint.3 7 Thus,
the Court concluded that the statutory text "might, or might not,
encompass oral complaints."38
Notwithstanding the ambiguity found on the surface of the
text, the Court found that "[s]everal functional considerations
indicate that Congress intended the antiretaliation provision to cover

30 Id.

31 Kasten,

131 S. Ct. at 1336.
Id. at 1330.
Id. (quoting Dolan v. Postal Service, 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006)).
34
Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1330.
s Id. at 1330-32.
36
Id. at 1332.
37 Id.
at 1333.
32

3

8Id.
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oral, as well as written, 'complaint[s]."' 3 9 The Court reasoned that
limiting the interpretation to written complaints would undermine the
FLSA's basic objective because the FLSA relies on information
received by employees for enforcement. 4 0 Moreover, the Secretary
of Labor has consistently held the view that "filed any complaint"
covers both oral and written complaints, and given the delegation of
enforcement powers to federal administrative agencies, this view
should be given a degree of weight, as it is reasonable and consistent
with the FLSA. 4 1
In his dissent, Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority,
interpreting that the FLSA provision in question does not include any
form of complaint made to the employer. 4 2 The plain meaning of the
statutory language, the dissent argues, "contemplates an official
grievance filed with a court or an agency, not oral complaints-or
even formal, written complaints-from an employee to an
employer." 4 3 Finding the phrase to be "clear in light of its context,"
the dissent saw no reason to "rely on abstractions of congressional

purpose." 4 4
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEAL

Dearth v. Holder, 641 F. 3d 499 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
Synopsis:

A citizen of the United States residing in Canada brought an
action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for a Second
Amendment violation. The complaint alleged that a statute, along
with its implementing regulations, made it impossible for a United
States citizen who lived outside the country to lawfully purchase a
firearm in the United States. The Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit reversed a lower court dismissal based on lack of standing,
39

Id.

40

Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1333-35.
Id. at 1335-36.

41
42

Id. at 1336-37.

43

id

44

1d. at 1339.
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because the injury was ongoing and the allegations pled constituted a
sufficiently real and immediate injury.
Facts and Analysis:

Stephen Dearth and the Second Amendment Foundation
sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that provisions of
18 U.S.C. § 922 and the corresponding regulations were
unconstitutional because they prevented Dearth from purchasing a
firearm. 45 The federal district court dismissed the suit for lack of
standing.4 6
The complaint challenged 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(9) and (b)(3)
and implementing regulations promulgated by the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives ("BATF"). 47 Dearth argued that
the rules made it impossible for a United States citizen who lived
outside the United States to lawfully purchase a firearm in the United
States. Specifically, section 922(a)(9) makes it unlawful for "any
person . . . who does not reside in any State to receive any firearms

unless such receipt is for lawful sporting purposes."4 8
Dearth, an American citizen, resides in Canada and no longer
maintains a residence in the United States.4 9 In 2006 and 2007,
Dearth twice attempted to purchase a firearm in the United States.5 0
He failed on both occasions, since he could not complete Form 4473,
required by the BATF before purchase, as question thirteen asks for
the purchaser's state of residence.5 1 Because Dearth was unable to
provide this information, the transaction could not be completed.5 2
Dearth intends to purchase a firearm and store it with relatives in
Ohio. 53

45

Dearth v. Holder, 641 F.3d 499, 500 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

46 Id.

47

Id. at 500-01.

48

Id

49

Id. at 501.

50 Id.

s' Dearth, 641 F.3d at 501.
52 Id.
53 Id.
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Holding:
The D.C. Circuit reversed the lower court's finding that Dearth
had no standing to challenge the laws and regulations that prevented
him from lawfully purchasing a gun in the United States.5 4 Given the
government's denial of Dearth's past applications to buy a gun and
his persisting intent to regularly return to the United States, the court
reasoned that Dearth faces a present and continuing injury that is
sufficiently real and immediate, thus entitling him to the standing
necessary to challenge the law.5 5
The court rejected the government's argument that it had not
affirmatively denied Dearth's application, finding that the
government had erected a scheme that precluded Dearth from
completing the required application. 5 6 In addition, the court found
that Dearth is experiencing adverse effects, because he intends to
travel to the United States soon. 5 7 As such, Dearth claimed a present
cognizable injury, whereby the federal scheme continues to frustrate
his plan to purchase a firearm.5 8
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 652 F.3d 431 (3d Cir. 2011)
Synopsis:
The Third Circuit considered, for the second time after a 2004
remand, recent revisions to rules promulgated by the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC"). While approving most of
the new regulations, the court vacated the rule relaxing limits on
cross-ownership of newspapers and broadcast outlets, because the
FCC failed to provide adequate notice required under the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").
In addition, certain
provisions concerned with diversity were remanded in order to give
the FCC an opportunity to justify or modify its approach to
advancing broadcast ownership among minorities and women.

54

Id. at 503.
Id.
56
d. at 502.
55

57

Dearth, 641 F.3d at 502-03.

58 Id
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Facts andAnalysis:
In 2002, the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
announcing that it would review a number of rules in its 2002
Biennial Regulatory Review, which was followed by a corresponding
order in 2003 modifying these rules.5 9 In Prometheus Radio Project
v. FCC, the Third Circuit concluded that the FCC failed to properly
consider proposals to promote minority broadcast ownership and
failed to provide reasoned analysis for the rules significantly relaxing
cross-ownership of media out, for example, ending the complete ban
on newspaper and broadcast cross-ownership. 60
In 2007, the FCC developed a new set of rules culminating in
the 2008 Order.61 While still pursuing a policy favoring relaxation of
the restrictions on cross-ownership, the specific 2003 rule was
discarded in favor of a policy in which the FCC would consider
newspaper or broadcast cross-ownership proposals on a case-by-case
basis using a four-factor test. 62 At the same time, the FCC adopted
the Diversity Order, which utilizes a number of policies to increase
ownership opportunities for "eligible entities," defined as all entities
that qualify as small businesses under the standards of the Small
Business Administration. 63
In response to the 2008 Order, a number of parties filed a
Petition for Reconsideration, and subsequently filed for a review of
the order with the Third Circuit, which consolidated the cases, so as
to again consider the FCC's news rules.6 4
Holding:
The court affirmed most of the FCC's new rules in the 2008
Order. 65 However, the cross-ownership rule was found to be

s Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 652 F.3d 431, 438 (3d Cir. 2011).
60 Id.
at 438-40.
61
Id. at 441.
62
Id. at 441-42.
63 Id. at 442-43.

6 Id. at 443-45.
65 Prometheus Radio Project, 652 F.3d at 472.
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66

promulgated in manner that violated the APA's notice requirement.
Furthermore, provisions of the Diversity Order were remanded,
because the court found the definition of "eligible entities" to be

unsatisfactory. 67
The APA requires agencies to provide notice of proposed
rulemaking that contains "either the terms or substance of the
proposed rule or description of the subjects and issues involved." 68
Once notice is given, "the agency shall give interested persons an
opportunity to participate in the rulemaking through submission of
written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral
presentation." 69 The court found this provision to require "enough
time with enough information to comment and for the agency to
consider and respond to the comments." 70 Finding the two sentences
in the FCC's Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking document to be
''simply too general and open-ended to have fairly apprised the public
of the Commission's new approach to cross-ownership," the Third
Circuit vacated and remanded the new cross-ownership rule
expecting the FCC to comply with the APA. 7 1
The dissent found that that notice and opportunity to comment
given by the FCC concerning to the new cross-ownership to be
adequate under the APA.7 2 Petitioners, the dissent argued, should
have been made aware of the cross-ownership rule because of a
string of recent notifications made by the FCC.7 3 The new rule
should have been anticipated as being the final course, in light of the
initial notice, because it was a logical outgrowth.7 4
Concerning the Diversity Order, the court found the definition
of "eligible entity" proscribed therein "lacks a sufficient analytical
connection to the primary issue that Order intended to address." 75
Because the FCC failed to show connection between the definition
Id.
Id.
61 Id at 448; 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
69 Prometheus Radio Project, 652 F.3d at 448; 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
7o Prometheus Radio Project, 652 F.3d at 450.
7' Id at 453-454.
66
67

72

Id at 473.
73 Id. at 474.
74
Id. at 475.
75

Id. at 471.
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and the goal adopted in the rule, the definition was found "arbitrary
and capricious."7 6 The goal was to promote broadcast ownership by
minorities and women, and the court found that FCC had not
"gathered the information required to address these challenges." 77 As
such, the Third Circuit vacated and remanded the provisions within
the Diversity Order implicated by the "eligible entity" definition, and
directed the FCC to justify or modify its approach to advancing
broadcast ownership by minorities and women.7 8
Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845
(9th Cir. 2011)
Synopsis:

Two nonprofit organizations representing the interest of
veterans brought a suit against the Department of Veterans Affairs
("VA") seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that the
administrative processing of the claims of injured veterans are
subject to chronic delay so severe as to constitute violations of the
veterans' statutory and constitutional rights. In an emotional and
consequential 2-1 decision, the Ninth Circuit largely agreed with the
veterans organizations. Lambasting the political branches for failing
to fulfill the obligation owed to veterans, the opinion ordered the VA
to undertake "system-wide" changes including, among other things,
the implementation of various VA mental health care initiatives.

Facts andAnalysis:

Of the 25 million veterans in the United States, roughly onequarter are enrolled in the VA's healthcare program. 7 9 Veterans have
a statutory right to receive hospital care and other medical services
under 38 U.S.C. § 1710. In addition, the VA is required to provide
readjustment counseling and related mental health care services to
Prometheus Radio Project, 652 F.3d at 471.
at 472.
78 Id.
76

77 Id.

" Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845, 852 (9th Cir.

2011).
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eligible veterans.80 Moreover, the Veterans Claims Assistance Act,
38 U.S.C. § 5103, states that agencies under the VA have a "duty to
assist" veterans, requiring veterans be given aid in developing all
evidence in support of their disability claims. 8 1
Currently, veterans experience long delays in the consideration
and adjudication of service-connected death and disability claims,
particularly when such claims are appealed. 82 Many veterans
suffering from serious disabilities, including post-traumatic stress
disorder ("PTSD"), suffer substantial and severe adverse
consequences as a result of this lengthy delay. 83 In just the six
months between October 2007 and April 2008, at least 1,467 veterans
died during the pendency of their appeals. 84
Veterans for Common Sense and Veterans United for Truth
filed a complaint in federal district court seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief on behalf of themselves, their members, and a
putative class composed of all veterans with PTSD who are eligible
for or who receive VA medical services, and veteran applicants for
and recipients of service-connected death or disability compensation
benefits based upon PTSD.
In the complaint, numerous statutory
and constitutional challenges were made to the administrative
practices that the VA uses for health care services and adjudication of
benefits claims. 86 The district court found the claimed delays to be
significant, determining that the "the health and welfare of veterans is
at stake." Nevertheless, the lower court concluded that the remedies
sought in the complaint were beyond its power, as they would require
a complete overhaul of the VA system, "something clearly outside of
this Court's jurisdiction." 87

Holding:

80 Id.
81Id.

at 856.

82

Id. at 859.

83

Id.

8

Id. at 860.

4

8 Veterans
86 Id.

8

for Common Sense, 644 F.3d at 860.

Id. at 864.
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As a threshold matter, the court held that the VA could not
rely on sovereign immunity for the purposes of the present
controversy, because Congress expressly waived such immunity.8 8
Reversing the lower court, the panel found the complaint, in
requesting "relief other than money damages," satisfied the federal
law waiving sovereign immunity. 8 9
The Ninth Circuit went on to find that the lack of adequate
procedures to protect against needless suffering among veterans
because of severe delays in their mental health care violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 90 Federal law has created
an entitlement to healthcare for eligible veterans, where is therefore a
statutorily created property interest, and the chronic delay of has
ripened into a deprivation of a legally protected right, based on the
absence of review procedures. 9 1
The court remanded with
instructions to determine what additional procedures or other actions
would remedy the existing due process violations. 9 2
From here, the panel moved to the claim invoking statutory
rights, where it described the shortcoming of the VA as involving
"critical benefits to sustain those incapacitated by mental disability,
delayed for an excessive period of time without satisfactory
explanation." 93 Here, the court found that the Administrative
Procedure Act precludes any possibly of obtaining the requested
relief.94
The Ninth Circuit concluded that "[t]he United States
Constitution confers upon veterans and their surviving relatives a
right to the effective provision of mental health care and to the just
and timely adjudication of their claims for health care and serviceconnected death and disability benefits."9 5 Though leaving most of
the details of the ordered changes to be worked out by the lower

88 Id. at

865.

89 Id. at 866-67.
90 Id. at

870-77.
for Common Sense, 644 F.3d at 876.
92
Id. at 877-788.
93 Id.
at 887-788
91Veterans

94 Id.

95

Id. at 890.
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court on remand, with instruction to have evidentiary hearings on the
matter, the Ninth Circuit recommended more procedural protections
for the claims processes, including "maximum time periods for
determinations at various stages of the claims adjudication process
and/or the need for a procedure to expedite claims where emergency
circumstances are shown to exist," and suggested alternative dispute
resolution techniques, citing the Supreme Court's mandate for nonadversarial administration of veterans' benefits in Walters v. National
Ass'n of RadiationSurvivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985).96

In a dissent that did not fail to match the majority's sense of
urgency, Chief Judge Kozinski stated that "[t]he majority tramples
over the strict jurisdictional limits Congress has imposed on our
ability to review the VA's decisions on veterans' benefits."9 7 The
dissent accuses the majority of "hijack[ing] the [VA's] mental health
treatment and disability compensation programs and install[ing] a
district judge as reluctant commandant-in-chief." 98

Id. at 887-88,
97 Veterans for Common Sense, 644 F.3d at 890 (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting).
96

98

Id.

